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ABSTRACT 
All Quiet on the Domestic Front 
The Household Exemption, Private and Public Spheres, and Social Media: 
The Third Theater of the Privacy Wars 
Gabriel Jackson 
-­‐ In 1995, the European Union adopted the Data Protection Directive, the principal statute 
governing data privacy within the E.U. In its so-called Household Exemption, the Directive 
excludes “natural persons [acting] in the course of a purely personal or household activity” 
from any legal obligation to abide by data protection laws in the E.U., an inconsequential 
exemption in 1995 that has since become a key cog in the debate over individual privacy. 
Technological innovation over the past twenty years has radically expanded the private 
individual’s capacity for processing personal data, affording natural persons many of the 
powers previously restricted to professionals and corporations. Problems have arisen from 
the misinformed view that those new powers of the individual should fall under the 
Household Exemption. The common thread is a misconception of what constitutes the 
sphere of private life that the Exemption is meant to protect. At the crux of the matter is a 
lack of definition as to what constitutes a purely personal or household activity in this age 
of increased individual processing power. In this paper, I shall take a deep dive into the 
history of the Household Exemption’s formation, ultimately proving the Exemption’s sole 
focus to be the protection of the individual’s private life. With that insight in mind, I shall 
examine the ways in which the Exemption has come to be misinterpreted, finishing with a 
suggested modification of the Household Exemption intended to remove all interpretive 
doubt. While not propounded to be a decisive, flawless resolution of the issue, I hope that 
my proposal and the underlying work, at a minimum, add an original and unique historical 
perspective to the discourse. 
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 In 1995, the European Union adopted the Data Protection Directive, the principal statute 
governing data privacy within the E.U.1 Twenty years later, the Directive is finally undergoing 
revision, and a new General Data Protection Regulation is set to replace it later this year.2 
Attempting to quantify the growth of the information society in that time period borders on the 
impossible. In 1995, the World Wide Web featured fewer than 20,000 websites;3 today, that 
number nears an even billion.4 In 1995, about five million E.U. citizens – 1.4% of the total E.U. 
population – used the Internet at all;5 today, 99.9% have access to high-speed broadband 
connections and 70% use the Internet regularly.6 In 1995, Mark Zuckerberg was eleven years old 
and a decade away from founding Facebook in his dorm room; in 2014, social networking 
services (SNS)7 are ubiquitous, and Facebook counts more than 1.2 billion active users.8 
 The intervening twenty years since the adoption of the DPD have seen the Internet grow 
at an unprecedented pace, revolutionizing the scale and ease of global communication. In the 
                                                
1 EC and EP, Directive 95/46/EC. Hereafter, Directive or DPD. 
2 For the latest version, see: EP, Report on the Proposal. 
3 BBC News, “Internet.” 
4 Netcraft, “April 2014 Web Server Survey.” 
5 Population of the fifteen E.U. Member States in 1995 drawn from UN, Replacement 
Migration, 85. Percentage of Internet users among that population (~1.366%) drawn from 
OECD, “Graph 5.8.” 
6 Broadband figure from EComm, “2013 Digital Agenda Scoreboard,” and usage figure from 
EComm, Commission Staff Working Document: Digital Agenda, 76. Regular Internet usage is 
defined by the Commission as at least once per week. 
7 Social networking services or SNS encompass all of the online social environments 
commonly referred to as social media or social networks. A more official definition is “online 
communication platforms which enable individuals to join or create networks of like-minded 
users” (WP29, Opinion 5/2009, 4). Within this paper, all four terms shall be used 
interchangeably. Furthermore, Facebook, by far the largest SNS, shall serve as a representative 
of all social networks. While certain observations in this paper are unique to Facebook, the 
majority can and should be applied to every social networking site. 
8 Facebook, “Company Info.” 
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past decade alone, online social networks have burst onto the scene, conduits for constant, 
instantaneous exchanges of information amongst individuals the world over. These rapid 
technological advances have radically altered the ways in which we connect with other people, 
resulting in great social benefit – such as wider access to information and learning and more 
avenues for uninhibited free expression – and one very great social detriment: an insidious 
assault on the individual’s right to privacy. 
 
Social	  Networking	  Services	  and	  Individual	  Privacy	  
 SNS have brought publishing power to the masses,9 and the masses are obsessed. Users 
create expansive personal profiles; take and upload photographs and videos; comment on current 
events and their interests; and share it all with friends, groups, and, often, the world at large. On 
Facebook alone, people share more than 500 Terabytes of data – the equivalent of 350 million 
five-megapixel photographs – and create roughly 2.3 billion pieces of unique content every 
single day.10 
 The extent of that sharing – the audience for each piece of information – operates like a 
digital loudspeaker, broadcasting everything from the mundane (e.g., a news article) to the 
incredibly personal (e.g., details about a relationship, financial deal, or medical treatment), and 
all to an audience far wider than imagined. A 2013 study by data scientists from Facebook and 
Stanford University revealed that “social media users consistently underestimate their audience 
size for their posts, guessing that their audience is just 27% of its true size.”11 
                                                
9 The term publishing power is borrowed from WP29, Statement, 3. 
10 Smith, “Social Networks;” Statistic Brain, “Social Networking Statistics.” 
11 Bernstein, Bakshy, Burke, and Karrer, “Quantifying the invisible audience,” 21. 
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 While the unauthorized divulgence of others’ personal information is no invention of the 
web,12 social networks have streamlined the process, exacerbating the effects that sharing 
personal information has on an individual’s privacy. Though the average person may not 
comprehend its full ramifications, the shift in scale has not gone wholly unnoticed: according to 
a recent Pew Research Center survey, 58% of Facebook users dislike it when others post content 
about them or pictures of them without asking permission; 43% dislike it when others see posts 
or comments that were not meant for their eyes; and 39% dislike the “[t]emptation or pressure to 
share too much info about [themselves].”13 
 No matter the medium, the publication of personal information entails a complex 
interplay of human rights. The right to free expression protects, to a certain extent, the activities 
of individuals who share information. However, the privacy rights of the individuals whose 
information is shared are equally important. Both rights are found in a multitude of national 
constitutions and have been recognized as fundamental since their inclusion in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Article 19 of the UDHR declares not only the freedoms of 
opinion and expression but also, more explicitly, the freedom to “impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”14 Article 12 affirms protections for one’s 
privacy, correspondence, and reputation.15 Neither is absolute; when the pair conflict in their 
application to a particular situation, a compromise must be forged to ensure their mutual 
observance. In practice, however, the weight afforded each fundamental right has been less than 
                                                
12 For example, gossip long predates the Internet age. 
13 Quotation is from Smith, “6 New Facts About Facebook.” Figures attained by combining 
the Strongly Dislike and Somewhat Dislike figures from Pew Research Center, “Survey 
Questions,” 3. 




equal, a trend exacerbated by the aforementioned extension of publishing power to the masses 
and the inability of privacy law to keep pace.16 
 
Protections	  for	  Online	  Privacy:	  The	  European	  Example	  
 Nowhere is this failure more evident nor of greater import than in the European Union, 
which accounts for 56% of global Internet traffic and whose citizens enjoy the world’s most 
stringent privacy protections.17 In drafting the Data Protection Directive, the European 
Commission assigned unprecedented weight to data privacy, asserting the fundamentality of the 
right. As Spiros Simitis, the former Hessian Data Protection Commissioner and chair of the 
Council of Europe’s Data Protection Experts Committee, proclaimed in a 1994 speech: 
Contrary to most other documents and nearly for the first time in the history of the 
Community, the Commission in its draft [of the DPD] said that the need for the 
Directive is based on the need to protect human rights within the Community. 
This is why, when we speak of data protection within the European Union, we 
speak of the necessity to respect the fundamental rights of the citizens.18 
 
The Directive more than adequately protected these rights in the 1995 online climate, and, had 
technology remained frozen in its early-1990s state, there would be no reason to think about 
revising it today. But, fortunately, technology has advanced, and much of the DPD must be 
updated to reflect that. 
 The current Directive predates the explosion of information sharing on the World Wide 
Web and thus understandably targets professionals, corporations, and E.U. Member States (MS) 
– actors who, at the time of the DPD’s enactment in 1995, had the power to disseminate personal 
                                                
16 Privacy law’s failure to keep pace with technological innovation is a recurring theme 
within Frank La Rue’s recent report on State surveillance and privacy (La Rue, Surveillance, ¶ 
50; 75). 
17 TeleGeography, “Global Internet Map 2012.” 
18 Cate, Privacy, 42, quoting Spiros Simitis, “Information Privacy and the Public Interest” 
(lecture, Annenberg Washington Program, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1994). 
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data to a large audience. In its so-called Household Exemption, the Directive excludes “natural 
persons [acting] in the course of a purely personal or household activity” from any legal 
obligation to abide by data protection laws in the E.U., an inconsequential exemption in 1995 
that has since become a key cog in the debate over individual privacy.19 Technological 
innovation over the past twenty years has radically expanded the private individual’s capacity for 
processing personal data, affording natural persons many of the powers previously restricted to 
professionals and corporations. Problems have arisen from the misinformed view that those new 
powers of the individual should fall under the Household Exemption. The faulty rationale 
coalesced out of several distinct misunderstandings, the most conspicuous of which shall be 
addressed later on. The common thread is a misconception of what constitutes the sphere of 
private life that the Exemption is meant to protect. At the crux of the matter is a lack of definition 
as to what constitutes a purely personal or household activity in this age of increased individual 
processing power. Though several attempts have been made to clarify the correct scope of the 
Exemption – most notably by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its ruling in 
Lindqvist – the guidance has been largely ignored in drafts of the new GDPR. 
 
Modernizing	  Privacy	  Law:	  Reformation	  and	  Formalization	  
 The time is ripe for a formalization of the Exemption’s contemporary scope and, more 
broadly, a clarification of the bounds of the private sphere in a modern, Web-driven society. The 
process of revising the Directive, begun in early 2012, has garnered a great deal of press –
 especially since Edward Snowden brought the scale of State mass surveillance to the world’s 
attention, turning data privacy into the topic du jour. While the increased attention is a huge net 
                                                
19 EC and EP, Directive 95/46/EC, § 3 ¶ 2. 
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positive for privacy rights, it has precipitated one unfortunate consequence: pressure on 
lawmakers to push through a GDPR with strengthened protections against State surveillance has 
relegated issues like the Household Exemption to the back burner. These other sections of the 
Directive are important and in dire need of the same vigorous scrutiny applied to curbing mass 
surveillance. Until that happens, the fundamental rights of E.U. citizens shall remain in flux. 
 While less overtly ominous than the Orwellian overtones of widespread State 
surveillance, the massive amount of content created by private individuals (data sharers) and 
containing information about others (data subjects) is no less a menace to privacy rights. The 
stakes of a failure to address the Household Exemption could not be higher: by next year, it is 
estimated that more than 60% of all digital data stored in databases – a figure roughly equivalent 
to the total amount of data currently in existence – will be created by individuals on social 
media.20,21 Protection from State surveillance and corporate misuse of data have been painted as 
the two major “fronts” in the “privacy wars,” but a battle plan blind to the great third threat is 
doomed to defeat.22 Its flank left unprotected, personal privacy shall die not at the hand of some 
treacherous government or greedy corporation but by an act of person-on-person betrayal. 
 To avoid such an ignominious end, the legislative bodies of the E.U. must conduct a 
careful, complete revision of the Directive that ensures respect for the fundamental human rights 
of citizens. The current Household Exemption is not explicit enough in its protections of private 
life, its outdated, unclear language inadequate for dealing with an information-dissemination 
apparatus as irrepressible and nebulous as SNS. Every day, hundreds of millions of individuals 
process personal data using SNS, and hundreds of millions more interact and share by way of 
                                                
20 Smith, “Social Networks.” 
21 Tucker, “Has Big Data Made Anonymity Impossible?” 
22 NYT Editorial Board, “A Second Front in the Privacy Wars.” 
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other forums, such as personal web pages or message boards. As the birthplace of privacy 
legislation and the site of the first data protection statutes in the early 1970s, Europe has long 
been the bellwether of privacy attitudes and regulations.23 Given its position at the forefront of 
the global privacy discourse and the tendency exhibited by a plurality of non-E.U. States to 
follow the European lead on privacy legislation, it is imperative that the Commission amends the 
Household Exemption to better define its scope. Europe must act the vanguard before its 
antiquated data law and the insidious misunderstandings engendered by it find further 
crystallization in privacy frameworks outside of the E.U.24 
 In this paper, I shall take a deep dive into the history of the Household Exemption’s 
formation, ultimately proving the Exemption’s sole focus to be the protection of the individual’s 
private life. With that insight in mind, I shall examine the ways in which the Exemption has 
come to be misinterpreted, finishing with a suggested modification of the Household Exemption 
intended to remove all interpretive doubt. While not propounded to be a decisive, flawless 
resolution of the issue, I hope that my proposal and the underlying work, at a minimum, add an 
original and unique historical perspective to the discourse. 
 
The	  Current	  Legal	  Regime	  for	  Data	  Protection	  and	  Privacy	  in	  the	  E.U.	  
 In an attempt to quantify the exponential growth of the data-sharing population since the 
creation of the E.U.’s current data law, this paper began with a few statistics on the proliferation 
of the information society since the Directive’s 1995 enactment. Despite that massive expansion 
                                                
23 Cate, Privacy, 32. 
24 See: Greenleaf, “Global Data Privacy Laws,” 6. Greenleaf specifically highlights the 




of its sphere of influence, the text of the DPD has remained unchanged, growing further outdated 
with each new innovation to the way personal data is shared across Europe. 
 The Directive is the primary legal instrument ensuring respect for E.U. citizens’ data 
privacy rights, but protections for private life and – as a subset thereof – personal data also exist 
in the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data and the three fundamental human rights treaties governing the 
E.U.: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. While the Directive’s status as lex specialis makes it the authority 
on data privacy matters within the E.U., those four texts remain significant; since they are 
binding on every Member State, each informs the European data privacy climate. 
 However, to assert the fundamentality of data privacy based solely off of the fact that a 
legal document lists it as such would be both a logical fallacy and a great injustice to the true 
foundations of the right. Since the Snowden revelations of June 2013, privacy has entered the 
public discourse to an unprecedented extent, but many of its defenders rely on a series of chilling 
hypotheticals and an unquestioning conviction that privacy trumps all because . . . privacy. Even 
the news media are not immune to the trend: the first page of results of a search for “data 
privacy” across New York Times articles results in a multitude of ominous warnings but exactly 
zero mentions of why the right is so critical.25 
                                                
25 Google search for data privacy site:nytimes.com executed in Firefox using the Disconnect 
Search browser extension on December 17, 2013. The articles returned – all accessed via the 
newspaper’s website – were: 
• Kanter, James, “Europe Moves to Shield Citizens’ Data,” New York Times, 




 Fundamental human rights are obligations deriving from that which makes us human, not 
from that which is written in human rights instruments. The documents are not rights in and of 
themselves but mere indices, often with an underappreciation of their own historical 
underpinning. Any attempt to appraise or hierarchize human rights, as this paper endeavors to do 
with privacy, must be firmly grounded in an understanding of the rights’ true fundamentality –
 not simply within a legal framework but as reinforcing something elemental to one’s humanity. 
 
The	  Legal	  Scope	  of	  Privacy:	  the	  Private	  Sphere	  and	  Private	  Life	  
 It is easy to assert that the rights to privacy and data privacy are designed to protect the 
individual’s private life, but exactly what is meant by private life varies greatly across academic 
                                                                                                                                                       
• Scott, Mark, “Europe Urges U.S. to Handle Data Privacy With Care,” New York 
Times, November 27, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/business/international/europe-urges-us-to-handle-
data-privacy-with-care.html. 
• Singer, Natasha, “Group Presses for Safeguards on the Personal Data of 
Schoolchildren,” New York Times, October 13, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/concerns-arise-over-privacy-of-
schoolchildrens-data.html. 
• Rotenberg, Marc, “Protecting Data Privacy,” New York Times, November 4, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/opinion/protecting-data-privacy.html. 
• Singer, Natasha, “Data Protection Laws, an Ocean Apart,” New York Times, 
February 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/technology/consumer-data-
protection-laws-an-ocean-apart.html. 
• Sengupta, Somini, “No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law,” New York 
Times, October 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-
action-so-states-move-on-privacy-law.html. 
• Singer, Natasha, “Deciding Who Sees Students’ Data,” New York Times, October 
5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/deciding-who-sees-students-
data.html. 
• Hakim, Danny, “Europe Aims to Regulate the Cloud,” New York Times, October 
6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/europe-aims-to-
regulate-the-cloud.html. 
• O’Brien, Kevin J, “Firms Brace for New European Data Privacy Law,” New York 




disciplines and depends heavily on the context.26 Within this paper, references to public and 
private refer to public and private life, the two complementary spheres of social interaction that 
comprise the totality of the human audience.27 This paper’s reference definition of private life – 
and, therefore, what is to be considered private and fall within the private sphere – is borrowed 
from the Oxford Dictionary of English, which defines private life as “a person's personal 
relationships, interests, etc., as distinct from their public or professional life.”28 While his 
ultimate conception of the public sphere is far more overtly political and caught up in defining 
the bourgeois political society, Jürgen Habermas’s brief overview of the rise of the public-private 
binary is helpful in further delineating the two spheres of human sociality discussed herein.29 
 In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, Habermas traces the earliest considerations of public and private to Ancient 
Greece, where “the sphere of the polis, which was common (koine) to the free citizens, was 
strictly separated from the sphere of the oikos . . . [in which] each individual is in his own realm 
(idia).”30 In the Greek system, only free, propertied males could own and exert control over an 
oikos, but the underlying theory can be extrapolated to the more liberal, modern society. As 
                                                
26 See, e.g.: boyd, “Taken Out of Context,” 16-21. 
27 To further clear up some of the core terms within this paper: public (as a noun) and the 
public sphere are synonymous, and public life is the portion of an individual’s life that takes 
place in those arenas. Similarly, private (also as a noun) and the private sphere are synonymous, 
with private life representing the portion of the individual’s life that takes place in the private 
sphere, or, to emphasize the complementary nature of the terms, the portion that does not take 
place in the public. 
28 Oxford Dictionary of English, s.v. “private life,” accessed April 18, 2014, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199571123.001.0001/m_en_gb066299
0. The establishment of professional as an antonym of private is problematic and shall be 
addressed in full later on; for now, the salient comparison is private and personal against public. 
29 To make it abundantly clear, Habermas’s complex spheres – his political and sociological 
division of the world into a public and private sphere – play no role in this paper. Those terms 
have different meanings here; see note 27 above. 
30 Habermas, Structural Transformation, 3. 
  
11 
Habermas recounts, in Ancient Greece it was the individual’s “private autonomy . . . on which 
their participation in public life depended. . . . Status in the polis was therefore based upon status 
as the unlimited master of an oikos.”31 Through the construction of a private sphere and the 
exercise of control over that sphere, men were granted status as citizens and allowed to 
participate in public discourse. The notion of control over one’s individual realm as a necessary 
foundation for independent, self-determined personhood is echoed in many modern theories of 
privacy, used to differentiate the private sphere, in which an individual has control, from the 
public, where they have little. 
 Among modern theories, the object of that control is generally the discourse concerning 
one’s personhood. In his seminal 1967 work, Freedom and Privacy, Alan F. Westin defines 
privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”32 Highlighting the 
fundamentality of privacy, James Q. Whitman quotes the renowned legal scholar Charles Fried’s 
proclamation that “a threat to privacy seems to threaten our very integrity as persons”33 and then 
notes the widespread agreement “that privacy is . . . fundamental to our ‘personhood.’”34 
Retaining control over the public discourse that bridges the private and public spheres is critical 
to maintaining what Westin termed personal autonomy: a basic human need deriving from “a 
fundamental belief in the uniqueness of the individual, in his basic dignity and worth as a . . . 
human being, and in the need to . . . safeguard his sacred individuality.”35 How that individuality 
is represented in the public sphere – how the self is presented to others – impacts the public 
                                                
31 Ibid. 
32 Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 7. 
33 Fried, “Privacy,” 477. 
34 Whitman, “Two Western Cultures,” 1153. 
35 Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 33. 
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interactions one has, which, in turn, inform either the preservation, evolution, or destruction of 
personal identity. 
 More apposite to this paper’s focus on European privacy protections, in 1954 the 
Bundesgerichtshof, the highest German court, handed down a decision in which it made a “direct 
reference to the constitutionally guaranteed duty to respect the claimant's dignity and to not 
infringe a free development of his person. Thus, the Federal Supreme Court clearly redefined the 
perception of privacy and settled the acknowledgment of ‘a right of personality.’”36 Three 
decades later, the Bundesgerichtshof expanded that protection of personhood to encompass 
personal data in its famous Census Judgment: 
In its ‘Census’ opinion, the Constitutional Court stated that the duty to respect the 
individual's dignity and his freedom to develop his personality must, especially in 
view of technologies allowing a processing of an ever greater amount of personal 
data, be complemented by a ‘right to informational self-determination.’ 
Individuals should, in other words, have the right to determine who can use their 
data, for what purpose, on what conditions, and for how long. Only then, the 
Court added, would individuals be able to freely form, express, and defend their 
opinions. The Court concluded that the more personal privacy is curtailed, the 
more individuals will gradually give up their constitutional rights. Informational 
self-determination, the Court stated, must therefore be seen and treated as an 
elementary precondition of a democratic society. Both its existence and 
functioning depend, thus, on the capacity of citizens to autonomously act and 
participate in society, a capability irrevocably linked to the knowledge and control 
of their personal data.37 
 
Concretized in the language of human rights, the right to informational self-determination (ISD) 
is the legal embodiment of Westin’s emphasis on maintaining control over one’s public 
discourse. The Directive and forthcoming Regulation are enforceable protections upholding that 
right, designed “to empower an individual with the tools necessary to regulate what personal 
                                                
36 Simitis, “Privacy,” 1991. 
37 Ibid., 1997-8. For further reading on the Census Judgment and the right to informational 




information is disseminated to the public.”38 They protect the data subject, providing control 
over one’s public image and preserving Westin’s personal autonomy.39 
 As a means of gaining a greater understanding of the ambit of privacy – a right so 
fundamental as to deserve its own binding E.U. Regulation – and, therefrom, of the precise 
extent of what European privacy laws must protect, the travaux préparatoires (preparatory work) 
of the ICCPR, ECHR, Charter, and the Directive shall be consulted extensively. The travaux 
offer invaluable insight into both the originally intended scope of the right and the interconnected 
ecosystem of treaty protections for privacy, the latter underscoring the importance of examining 
the entire body into which a new law – in this case, the forthcoming GDPR – must fit. 
 It also must be noted that, while protections for personal data are more apparently 
apposite to individual privacy as influenced via the World Wide Web, the old-fashioned right to 
privacy verges on equal relevance and importance. The lex specialis / generalis hierarchy likely 
reserves a measure of superiority for data privacy laws, but a recent U.N. General Assembly 
resolution blurs the line between the two rights. The text, unanimously adopted without a vote, 
“Calls upon all States . . . To respect and protect the right to privacy, including in the context of 
digital communications” and, in addition, “Affirms that the same rights that people have offline 
must also be protected online, including the right to privacy.”40 As of yet, no U.N. treaty has 
identified a separate right to data privacy. The resolution is an affirmation that personal data falls 
under the umbrella of the right to privacy, thereby assuming identical protections and limitations 
and eliminating the need (on the U.N. scale, at least) for a data-specific right.41 
                                                
38 Santolli, “The Terrorist Finance Tracking Program,” 566. 
39 Whitman, “Two Western Cultures,” 1161. 
40 UN, “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age,” § 4(a); 3. 
41 The precise ordering of and separation between the two rights (privacy and data privacy) 
within each of the hierarchies in which they might possibly be ranked (broad versus narrow 
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Turning	  to	  History:	  Consulting	  the	  Travaux	  Préparatoires	  
	  




1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 
 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks. 
 
 Beginning with the broadest of the binding treaties,42 the ICCPR affirms that “[n]o one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy” and that “[e]veryone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interference.”43 Coinciding with the 1948 
adoption of the UDHR, the first attempt to include a right to privacy in the drafting of the ICCPR 
failed to gain traction.44 However, by 1953, all doubt as to its fundamentality had vanished. As 
recounted in the official travaux, “[I]t was argued that the covenant would suffer a serious 
omission if it failed to include an article on such an elementary right as the right to privacy.”45 
The basis for the right was drawn from the protections for privacy in “the constitutions or laws of 
                                                                                                                                                       
scope; general versus specific language; intra- versus inter-continental application; practicable 
versus impracticable enforcement; etc.) is far beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to declare 
that the topical scope of this paper – the destruction of privacy on the World Wide Web – is 
concerned with the whole of the right to data privacy and the corresponding subsection of the 
right to privacy. There is very little legal distinction between the two, so the rights shall be 
treated herein as interchangeable coequals. 
42 In geographical scope, at least. 
43 UN, International Covenant, § 17. 
44 Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the ICCPR, 339. Inclusion of a 
protection for privacy was first proposed by Australia at the second session of the Drafting 
Committee in 1948, but it was rejected by a margin of three votes to two, with three abstentions. 
45 Ibid., 340, emphasis mine. 
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most, if not all, countries” as well as from Article 12 of the UDHR.46 The drafters knew that the 
broad, imprecise language of the non-binding UDHR would not suffice for incorporation into the 
legally binding ICCPR, but, forced toward universality by the need for the ICCPR to be 
“applicable to all legal systems of the world,”47 they restricted the Covenant’s privacy protection 
to “a general rule, leaving the exceptions thereto and the methods of application to the legislation 
of each contracting State.”48 
 




(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 
 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
 Adopted in 1950, the ECHR partially mitigates the generalizations plaguing 
intercontinental instruments by expanding and clarifying the limitations of the right to privacy; 
however, in what is likely the primary legal precedent for the Household Exemption, the treaty 
indirectly exempts individual violations of another’s privacy, focusing solely on State 
interference with the individual’s right. Article 8 of the ECHR asserts that “[e]veryone has the 
                                                
46 Ibid., 339. See also, generally: Greenleaf, “Global Data Privacy Laws.” 




right to respect for his private . . . life” and that “[t]here shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right.”49 
 Drafting of the Convention began in 1949, and Article 12 of the UDHR was again cited 
as the starting point for negotiations.50 With a mandate to pay attention to the ongoing work of 
the UN, many early drafts of the ECHR contained an article on privacy effectively identical to 
that of the UDHR.51 The next phase of drafting required a more precise definition for each 
right,52 and, as privacy still lacked one of adequate detail, a placeholder for an article on privacy 
was set aside.53 The United Kingdom, which had tried and failed to strike the privacy paragraph 
completely out of the first ECHR draft,54 now proposed a new version with an unprecedented 
wrinkle: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom from governmental interference with his 
privacy.”55 The British innovation was then modified by a conference of senior drafting officials 
into its ultimate expression of “interference by a public authority” and, though the draft ECHR 
was to undergo several more rounds of scrutiny before its adoption, the wrinkle raised no 
                                                
49 CoE, ECHR, § 8. 
50 CoE, “Preparatory Work on Article 8,” 2. The first draft of the Convention guaranteed the 
“inviolability of his private life . . . in accordance with Article 12 of the United Nations 
Declaration.” 
51 Ibid., 4 § 5; 4-5 § 7. The honour/reputation phrase is noticeably absent, but that is outside 
of this paper’s scope. 
52 Ibid., 6 § 10. 
53 CoE, Committee of Experts, 188. 
54 CoE, “Preparatory Work on Article 8,” 2 § 3. 
55 CoE, Committee of Experts, 202, emphasis mine. Interestingly, while the English 
translation of the placeholder reads, “Art. . . . On privacy. . . ,” the original French text only 
provides for an “Art. . . . Concernant liberté de domicile et correspondance. . . ,” literally an 
article concerning the liberty of the home and correspondence (both sets of suspension points 
from the original texts). It would be difficult to try to read a general right to privacy into those 
two specific protections for the home and correspondence, which are typically enumerated in 
addition to the general right (e.g., as in the UDHR). Therefore, while the U.K. delegation 
invented a new privacy-limiting wrinkle, they simultaneously reintroduced the broader, stronger 
UDHR protection of the right. 
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eyebrows high enough to seek change.56 That simple qualifying phrase profoundly altered the 
purview of the article: instead of protecting against interference with privacy perpetrated by any 
type of actor, its scope is limited to State action, exempting the behavior of legal and natural 
persons and approximating the effect of the Household Exemption. 
 
 Such a limitation is noticeably absent from the ICCPR’s article on the right to privacy – 
an uncharacteristic instance of discord between the two treaties57 – but not for lack of attention to 
the matter, its omission coming only after much diligent deliberation. While the drafters of the 
ECHR incorporated the British wrinkle without any documented debate,58 their counterparts at 
the U.N. carefully considered the implications of exempting private individuals. 
 In 1953, during the 9th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the 
Philippines proposed for inclusion in the ICCPR an article dealing with the right to privacy and 
worded almost identically to the rejected Australian proposal of five years prior. The discussion 
                                                
56 CoE, “Preparatory Work on Article 8,” 9 § 15-16. It is worth noting that the U.K. also 
proposed limiting the protection for free expression embodied in ICCPR § 19 to “governmental 
interference” – twice in the same clause, no less – in its comments of 4 January, 1950 to the U.N. 
Secretary-General (CoE, “Preparatory Work on Article 8,” 6-8 § 8). This predates the British 
comment on the ECHR’s right to privacy and suggests that, instead of being anti-privacy (or 
perhaps pro-free expression for non-governmental entities), it is more likely that the U.K.’s 
quarrel concerned international interference with non-State action, generally. This is supported 
by the discourse of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in its 9th Session (1953) regarding 
the Anglo-Saxon objection to the broad scope of the ICCPR’s privacy article, quoted in the 
following section’s discussion of the Covenant. It should also be noted that the freedom of 
expression – codified in Article 10 of the ECHR and often the foil of privacy – is the only other 
article in the Convention that limits actionable violation to State interference. 
57 CoE, “Preparatory Work on Article 8,” 9. In the words of the Council of Europe: “[T]here 
is no such close affinity between Article 8 of the Convention and Article 17 of the draft [ICCPR] 
. . . as exists between most of the other Articles of Section I [‘Rights and freedoms’] of the 
Convention and the corresponding Articles of the draft Covenant.” 
58 Ibid., 9 § 15-16. 
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centered on the phrase “arbitrary and unlawful interference,”59 a slight revision of the failed 1948 
version’s protection against “unreasonable interference.”60 The new formulation was interpreted 
as protecting the individual “against acts not only of public authorities, but also of private 
persons,” its repetition of the ECHR’s exact term (“public authority”) presumably a direct 
censure of the Convention’s restricted scope of application.61 The United Kingdom again found 
itself petitioning for the exemption of non-State interference, this time as part of a coalition of 
common law States: Australia, the U.K., and the United States all argued that the Covenant’s 
privacy article “should be confined to imposing restraints on governmental action and should not 
deal with acts of private individuals, which were a matter for municipal legislation.”62 Their 
protest was founded on fears that “the article as formulated might be construed as requiring 
changes to be made in existing rules of private law . . . [raising] considerable difficulties 
particularly for countries with Anglo-Saxon legal traditions.”63 However, this argument for a 
type of Household Exemption from the ICCPR’s privacy article was undermined when several 
States, including Australia and the U.K., “pointed out that the article, which was couched in 
general terms, merely enunciated principles, leaving each State free to decide how those 
principles were to be put into effect.”64 The United States briefly submitted an amendment that, 
among other changes, restricted illegal interference to “public authorities,”65 but it was quickly 
withdrawn.66 The Commission on Human Rights unanimously adopted the unrestricted version,67 
                                                
59 Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the ICCPR, 341. 
60 Ibid., 339. 




65 Ibid., 343. 
66 Ibid., 343. 
67 By a vote of 12-0, with four abstentions. See: ibid., 345. 
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and then, seven years later, in the final vote on the individual article, the Third Committee of the 
UNGA followed suit.68 
 




Respect for private and family life 
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications. 
 
 A half-century passed between the formulation of the ECHR and ICCPR and the 
proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and, thanks to the 
explosive pace of technological development in the intervening years, neither of the older 
treaties’ privacy protections aged particularly well. Determining the Charter’s position within the 
legal framework influencing the GDPR is complex: as a modern text specific to the E.U., it 
would seem more relevant than its ancestors; however, the Charter explicitly subordinates itself 
to the ECHR, a small hurdle to surmount. The subordinating clause reads as follows: 
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the [ECHR], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection.69 
 
Because a right to privacy already exists in the ECHR, the wider scope of the Charter’s 
corresponding right – particularly its lack of a limit to State-perpetrated interference – would 
                                                
68 By a vote of 70-0, with three abstentions: the U.S., the U.K., and Cuba, which was going 
through a period of intense political turnover at the time of the 1960 vote. See: ibid., 842-50. 
69 EP, EC, and EComm, Charter of Fundamental Rights, § 52 ¶ 3. 
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seem effectively worthless, its legal import indistinguishable from that of its 1950 counterpart.70 
However, on closer examination, the supersession of the Convention’s privacy article is 
incomplete. 
 That the drafters of the Charter chose not to retain the restrictive second paragraph of the 
ECHR’s privacy right has profound implications in light of the subordinating clause reproduced 
above. The “meaning and scope” of the CFR’s right are indeed the same as those of the 
Convention’s, but the meaning and scope of its “permissible limitations” to that right – to borrow 
a term from the ECHR’s travaux préparatoires – are not.71 In their relation of the incorporation 
of the British wrinkle into the draft privacy article, the official travaux delineate the function of 
the article’s first paragraph as a “statement of the right itself” and that of its second paragraph as 
a “statement of permissible limitations.”72 Erring on the side of over-explanation, this means that 
the wrinkle, which opens the second paragraph of the Convention’s article, is not part of the 
fundamental right protected by the ECHR and, derivatively, that the Charter is not bound to 
maintain its meaning and scope. 
 The counterclaim is that, while the British wrinkle may not be part of the ECHR’s “right 
itself,” it does appear to inform the scope of the right and should therefore be replicated 
faithfully as part of the scope of the Charter’s. Supporting this claim is the official explanation of 
the right to privacy’s basis under the CFR, written by the same E.U. body that drafted the Charter 
and to which “due regard” must be paid by Member States and the CJEU.73 The explanatory text 
                                                
70 Why the Charter’s drafters did not simply copy the corresponding rights verbatim from the 
ECHR is an interesting question, given that their new formulations retain all of the functionality 
of the old. 
71 CoE, “Preparatory Work on Article 8,” 6 fn. 3, emphasis mine. 
72 CoE, “Preparatory Work on Article 8,” 6 fn. 3. 
73 EP, EC, and EComm, Charter of Fundamental Rights, 391. This section of the Preamble 
was added in the 2007 text that replaced the original Charter upon the Treaty of Lisbon’s entry 
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acknowledges the primacy of the ECHR’s privacy article on account of the subordinating clause, 
but it simultaneously serves to highlight – presumably unintentionally – the clause’s confusing 
structural ambiguity. It is unclear whether the clause is intended to transpose only the meaning 
and scope of the “right itself” or those of the encompassing article, as well. The process as 
understood by the drafters of the Charter reads as follows: 
“The rights guaranteed in Article 7 [the CFR’s privacy right] correspond to those 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR. . . . In accordance with [the Charter’s 
subordinating clause], the meaning and scope of [the CFR’s privacy] right are the 
same as those of the corresponding article of the ECHR. Consequently, the 
limitations which may legitimately be imposed on this right are the same as those 
allowed by Article 8 of the ECHR.74 
 
On the surface, the reasoning appears sound, but, upon closer inspection, it begins to come apart 
at the seams. “The rights guaranteed in Article 7” are the rights to respect for private and family 
life, the home, and communications; “those guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR” are effectively 
identical,75 and the article’s second paragraph is clearly not among them. It is a qualification of 
the rights enumerated in the preceding paragraph and not a right in and of itself. In other words: 
there is no human right to a limitation on the right to privacy. Furthermore, the explanatory text’s 
interpretation of a corollary foisting the limitations of the ECHR’s article on its own Article 7 is 
unfounded. The subordinating clause says nothing about a requirement to transpose the meaning 
and scope of the permissible limitations of a right – just the meaning and scope of the right itself. 
The U.K. delegation, the inventor of the limitation to the ECHR’s right, intended it to be a part of 
                                                                                                                                                       
into force. The official Explanations begin with an assertion that “[t]hey have no legal value and 
are simply intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter” (EC, Charter: Explanations, 3), but 
the 2007 adaption suggests otherwise. If Union courts and MS must now pay attention to the 
explanations, they must have some legal import. 
74 EC, Charter: Explanations, 25. 
75 From the explanatory text: “To take account of developments in technology the word 
‘correspondence’ has been replaced by ‘communications’” (ibid). 
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the first paragraph before the Conference of Senior Officials unceremoniously shifted it down.76 
This demotion suggests a hierarchy within the purview of the ECHR’s privacy right: on the first 
tier, outlining the scope of the right itself are extensions to private and family life, the home, and 
correspondence; on the second tier, the British wrinkle delimits only the scope of the permissible 
limitations. Moreover, the Charter, as a primary source of Union law,77 is unquestionably 
permitted to provide “more extensive protection” for the right to privacy, in this case by 




Protection of personal data 
 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by 
law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning 
him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority. 
 
 The Charter follows its privacy article with one concerning the fundamental right to the 
protection of personal data, a first among international human rights treaties. The explanatory 
text traces the article’s lineage from the ECHR’s privacy article, Convention 108, and, primarily, 
the Directive.78 Though perhaps an inconsequential innovation in light of the corresponding 
expansion of privacy’s scope – which, as previously mentioned, now unquestionably covers 
personal data privacy and protection issues – the separation and emphasis placed on protecting 
                                                
76 CoE, “Preparatory Work on Article 8,” 6 § 10. 
77 EP, “Sources and Scope of European Union Law.” 
78 EC, Charter: Explanations, 26. 
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personal data hammers home the importance of that specific branch of privacy within the EU. 
The weight accorded to personal data by the Charter is even more significant in light of the 
Charter’s increasing influence within the European human rights infrastructure. As the European 
Commission asserted in an April 2014 report on the Charter’s application, “the importance and 
prominence of the E.U. Charter continues to rise[, and] the Court of Justice of the E.U. 
increasingly applies the Charter in its decisions.”79 Viviane Reding, vice president of the 
European Commission, took it a step further: “I could imagine that one day citizens in the 
Member States will be able to rely directly on the Charter – without the need for a clear link to 
E.U. law.”80  
 
Council	  of	  Europe	  Convention	  108	  on	  Data	  Protection	  
 
Article 1 – Object and purpose 
 
The purpose of this convention is to secure in the territory of each Party for every 
individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to 
automatic processing of personal data relating to him (“data protection”).81 
 
 The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data presents a unique case within the web of privacy 
treaties. Though soon to be joined by the forthcoming GDPR, Convention 108 is currently the 
                                                
79 EComm, “Fundamental Rights,” 1. 
80 Ibid. 
81 CoE, Convention 108. 
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sole legally binding international instrument strictly concerned with data protection.82 Upon the 
Convention’s 1981 ratification by the CoE, the Commission of the European Community – the 
precursor to the modern E.U.’s European Commission – submitted an official recommendation 
that all Community Member States ratify the Convention.83 Every State complied, and, today, 
the treaty is binding upon all E.U. Members, as well as the Union as a whole.84 
 For this paper’s purposes, there is not much of special note in the body of Convention 
108 as it currently stands; it contains no Household Exemption or anything similar. However, 
even more hopelessly outdated than the Directive, the Convention is currently undergoing a 
parallel process of modernization and revision. Much is being done to harmonize the Convention 
with the forthcoming Regulation.85 Among numerous other amendments – and underscoring the 
urgency of the concerns addressed in this paper – drafts of the modernized Convention 108 
contain a Household Exemption suffering from the same definitional ambiguities that plague the 
Directive’s.86 
 While drafts of the GDPR do not count the Convention among its foundational texts, 
there are consistent allusions to the importance of other “international commitments” or, more 
explicitly, to “legally binding conventions or instruments with respect to the protection of 
                                                
82 EUAFR and CoE, Handbook, 16. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is legally binding, 
but its focus is far beyond data protection alone; data protection is restricted to the bounds of its 
eighth article. The Data Protection Directive is not a legally binding instrument; it is an 
instruction, addressed to E.U. Member States, charging each to implement the Directive’s 
provisions within its own legal framework. Interestingly – and not without controversy – the 
Regulation removes much of that latitude, acting as a binding text on its own, irrespective of 
State implementation. A deeper discussion of the implications of this switch is, while fascinating, 
well outside of the scope of this paper. 
83 EComm, Commission Recommendation, § 2 ¶ 1. 
84 EUAFR and CoE, Handbook, 17. 
85 Greenleaf, “‘Modernising’ Data Protection Convention 108,” 4-5; 8-9; 11. 
86 Consultative CC 108, Propositions of Modernisation, § 3 ¶ 1bis. “This Convention shall 




personal data.”87 Regardless of the absence of a specific reference, the Regulation’s drafters are 
certainly aware of the concurrent process underway at the CoE. The latter’s incorporation of a 
Household Exemption – copied almost verbatim from the Directive, no less – can only be read as 
an endorsement of the Exemption’s current wording, further crystallizing the interpretive 
confusion. 
 The GDPR’s excision of all specific reference to the Convention is interesting in light of 
the Directive’s heavy reliance thereupon. Highlighting the close relationship, the DPD explicitly 
cites the influence of Convention 108 in its preamble, providing that “the principles . . . 
contained in this Directive . . . give substance to and amplify those contained in the 
[Convention].”88 In a testament more to the lightning pace of technological innovation than to 
any particular fault of either instrument, the DPD, intended to update an already-antiquated 








                                                
87 EP, Report on the Proposal, Amendment 137. 
88 EC and EP, Directive 95/46/EC, ¶ 11. 
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Approaching	  the	  Now:	  The	  Directive	  and	  the	  Household	  Exemption	  
 That the Directive is outdated is no great secret, but the extent of its limitations is only 
appreciable when presented against the immense expansion of ways in which individuals’ data 
must now be protected. In a 2011 survey ordered by the Commission, 74% of Europeans saw 
disclosures of personal information as “an increasing part of modern life” and did not feel that 
they have complete control over their online data, while 72% feared that they “give away too 
much personal data online.”89 Chief among the innovations propelling this worrying trend 
toward increased data obligations is the online social network, which has revolutionized the ways 
in which we share data. The exponential growth of the online population is only the most 
quantifiable aspect of this revolution; far more damaging to individual privacy are spikes, largely 
driven by social media, in the amount and type of data we share, the scope the audience with 
whom we share it, and the ease with which others can access that data. 
 However, it would be remiss to blame all of this on SNS and release the authors of the 
Directive from any culpability for the present situation: the radical alteration of the data sharing 
landscape was well underway by 1995. Certainly by the time of the Directive’s 1998 entry into 
force, in the midst of the dot-com bubble, there were already concerns over the extent to which 
the nascent Internet empowered individuals to share personal data. 
 In their seminal 1998 book entitled None of Your Business: World Data Flows, 
Electronic Commerce, and the European Privacy Directive, Peter P. Swire and Robert E. Litan 
thoroughly examined the legal implications of the Directive and found Internet privacy to be of 
“great long-term significance to the overall success of data protection efforts.”90 In what was 
                                                
89 EComm, Special Eurobarometer 359, 16; EComm, “How Will the Data Protection Reform 
Affect Social Networks?” 
90 Swire and Litan, None of Your Business, 64. 
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already “a world of pervasive personal computers” with forecasts of continued escalation in the 
“number and power of [data] processors,” the authors acknowledged that it was “far from clear 
that there [was] any workable way to implement data protection laws on the Internet.”91 
 
The	  Directive	  
 The Directive’s express purpose is to regulate the ways in which data processors may 
process the personal data of E.U. data subjects. The text is written in general terms to afford 
extensive protection to individuals’ data privacy, but its heavy reliance on jargon does no favors 
to laypeople wishing to learn about their rights. Personal data does not refer specifically to 
electronic data but to any type of information about a data subject, “an identified or identifiable 
natural person.”92 That encompasses everything from the most mundane (e.g., one’s waist size, 
favorite color, or desire to visit San Francisco) to the most compromising (e.g., an explicit 
photograph; bank, healthcare, or telephone record; or deeply personal secret), regardless of 
whether the subject is explicitly identified by name or merely “can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”93 Only if 
personal data is completely and irreversibly anonymized may it be processed by data processors. 
Processing is to perform “any operation or set of operations . . . upon personal data, such as 
collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
                                                
91 Ibid., 70; 65; 64. 




combination, blocking, erasure or destruction,”94 and data processors include, among other 
entities, corporations, public agencies, and, most relevant to this paper, natural persons.95 In 
theory, any action carried out by an individual on the personal data of another would seem to 
warrant regulation under the Directive. If Barbara takes a photograph of Kevin (recording), 
transfers it to her computer (organization; storage), opens a program to crop the image (retrieval; 
consultation; alteration; use), and uploads it to her Facebook account (organization; storage; 
disclosure), she has performed at least ten operations on Kevin’s personal data. However, in 
practice, most of – if not all – Barbara’s actions would be excluded from Directive scrutiny by 
virtue of a brief but significant clause known as the Household Exemption. 
 






2. This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data: 
 
–– by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. 
 
 The Household Exemption is a one-line limitation on the Directive’s scope that places 
certain processing activities of natural persons outside of the DPD’s jurisdiction – more 
precisely, activities purely personal in nature or of a household variety. What those adjectives 
entailed in the early-1990s is unclear – what makes an activity purely personal? What is a 
household activity? – and two decades of technological innovation have only further obscured 
                                                
94 Ibid., § 2(b). 
95 Ibid., § 2(e). 
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their intended scope. However, by looking at both its initial conception and its interpretation by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, a clear picture emerges of what the Exemption seeks 
to protect. 
 The Directive itself provides very little insight as to the types of activities intended for 
exemption, its preamble listing only “correspondence and the holding of records of addresses” as 
examples of “exclusively personal or domestic” processing.96 While not a list of explicitly 
exempted activities, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29)97 recently provided 
several examples of the types of processing undertaken by natural persons in the early-1990s, 
illustrating what the Exemption might have sought to safeguard: maintaining an address book on 
a home computer; possession of the bank, health, or school records of family members; storing 
individuals’ contact details on a basic mobile phone; or mentioning friends or coworkers within a 
personal diary.98 The salient detail connecting all of these undertakings is that they are activities 
of private life, occurring within the private sphere. The Exemption’s focus on activities in the 
private sphere is important for two main reasons: one, the Exemption’s original focus was the 
protection of that private sphere and not of any activity that went beyond the private and entered 
the public sphere, as it has recently come to be interpreted; and, two, the individual’s ability to 
transcend that private-public boundary in 1995 was but a fraction of what it is today. 
 The Directive was not designed to be a static document; not only did the drafters seek to 
protect against contemporary threats to privacy, they used deliberately broad language to enable 
the DPD to anticipate and adapt to future developments. Aware of the magnitude of the changes 
occurring within the information society – case in point, the first draft of the Directive predates 
                                                
96 Ibid., ¶ 12. 
97 The independent advisory body established by the DPD to issue opinions and track 
implementation of the Directive. 
98 WP29, Statement, 2. 
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the public unveiling of the World Wide Web by nine months99 – the drafters acknowledged that 
the ongoing metamorphosis was making it “considerably easier” to process personal data. One of 
the most impactful and immediately tangible advances in processing technology was the World 
Wide Web, which, among the countless other benefits afforded by a universal information 
network, allowed natural persons unprecedented power to execute, in particular, one type of 
processing regulated by the DPD: disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available. 
 Prior to the World Wide Web, there were not many options open to a natural person 
wishing to share information with a large number of people. They could have printed and 
distributed fliers, used an auto dialer to reach the masses by telephone, or paid a newspaper or 
television company to relay their message. Exercising one’s free expression rights in the public 
sphere was expensive, time-consuming, and required a lot of effort. That all changed with the 
invention of the Web and subsequent explosion of the online population, which dramatically 
alleviated the burden. It did not happen over night, but over time the Web emerged as a medium 
through which large populations could be reached simultaneously and at relatively low cost.100 
Processing personal data by disclosure became even easier and more widely achievable with the 
rise of social media platforms – a movement colloquially termed “Web 2.0.” As a further 
distillation of the Web’s fertile environment for free expression, social networks create a perfect 
storm of privacy concerns: they facilitate far more social connections between friends, 
acquaintances, and strangers than could be achieved offline; they discourage anonymization,101 
                                                
99 First draft: November 5, 1990; Public unveiling: August 23, 1991. 
100 The price of access has long kept marginalized populations off of the Web, but costs 
continue to decrease and, as evidenced by the growth in the online populations of underserved 
areas, universal access is on the horizon. 
101 E.g., Facebook’s requirement that users sign up with their real name. 
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allowing for the cultivation of extensive profiles of real personal data; and they act as a 
megaphone for free expression, encouraging user-generated content and its dissemination to a 
wide audience. 
 In the international human rights regime, privacy and the freedom of expression are often 
painted as incompatible and pitted against one another, but, in the case of the Household 
Exemption, the conflict does not even enter the equation. A look at the two relevant sections of 
the Directive shall prove that the document as a whole places privacy firmly above free 
expression.102 An examination of the Directive’s travaux préparatoires shall underscore the 
general primacy of privacy while also affirming that the Household Exemption was intended 
solely as a protection of the private sphere. Finally, an analysis of the CJEU’s opinion in the 
Lindqvist case shall confirm the private sphere as the Exemption’s exclusive focus. 
 
The	  Sphere	  of	  Private	  Life:	  The	  Sole	  Focus	  of	  the	  Household	  Exemption	  
The	  Directive	  and	  the	  Primacy	  of	  Privacy	  over	  Free	  Expression	  
 
[D]ata protection may be a subject on which you can have different answers to 
the various problems, but it is not a subject you can bargain about.103 
 –– Spiros Simitis 
 
 The Directive – the first authoritative text – is a groundbreaking legal document in many 
ways, but most important and enduring is its novel averment of the importance of privacy in 
                                                
102 Recall the severely limited scope of Article 9. 
103 Cate, Privacy, 42, quoting Spiros Simitis, “Information Privacy and the Public Interest” 
(lecture, Annenberg Washington Program, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1994). Simitis’s 
comment concerns the draft Directive, but the pertinent principles survived the deliberative 
phase and were incorporated into the final version. 
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relation to other fundamental rights. Upon adoption of the DPD in 1995, the Commission was 
fully aware of the incompatible relationship between privacy and free expression and, as 
evidenced in several key sections of the text, came down firmly on the side of privacy. That 
preference has far-reaching implications, both for the purpose of properly weighting competing 
rights obligations in this paper’s assessment of the household exemption and, more broadly, for 
the future of privacy legislation in Europe. 
 In his 1997 book entitled Privacy in the Information Age, Fred H. Cate examines the 
Directive’s declaration of what he terms “the primacy of the human right to privacy.”104 His 
analysis begins with the above quote from Spiros Simitis, which speaks to the DPD’s inflexible 
stance on the preeminence of privacy – in weighing competing rights, data protection is off the 
bargaining table. In support of Simitis’s proposition, Cate specifically focuses on the first and 
ninth of the Directive’s thirty-four articles for his defense of privacy’s precedence. Here follows 




Object of the Directive 
 
       1.  In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the 
 fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their 
 right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. 
 
 Cate commences with the observation that “the [Directive]’s terms, and the process from 
which it resulted, reflect a commitment to privacy as a basic human right, on par with the rights 
of self-determination, freedom of thought, and freedom of expression.”105 However, I believe 
                                                
104 Ibid., 43. 
105 Cate, Privacy, 42. 
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that the terms of the DPD do more than merely place privacy on par with other fundamental 
rights.106 The first article is notable not only for its pronouncement of the fundamentality of data 
privacy but also for the Commission’s inclusion of the qualifier in particular. The phrase 
generally refers to either specificity or specialness, with significant legal consequences hanging 
in the balance of that interpretation. A qualifier of specificity simply identifies in greater detail 
the exact boundaries of a term, but one of specialness implies superiority, a hierarchy in which 
the qualified term outranks the unqualified. The French copy of the Directive makes it clear that 
the Commission intended in particular to indicate the latter. The French text employs 
notamment, in the sense of notably or that which merits special note, instead of particulièrement 
or the Anglicization en particulier.107 It is therefore evident that the Commission intended to 
place data privacy in a special category and, in so doing, emphasize its essential role in the 
preservation of personhood – a relationship that we will shortly analyze in greater depth. 
 Cate underscores this interpretation of the first article with a detailed look at the ninth, 




Processing of personal data and freedom of expression 
 
Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from the provisions of 
this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter VI for the processing of personal data 
carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary 
expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the 
rules governing freedom of expression. 
                                                
106 Cate’s conclusion, to be discussed momentarily, contradicts his opening statement. In it, 
he touts the preeminence of privacy and, in fact, goes further in his trumpeting of privacy than 
this author finds comfortable. 
107 EC and EP, Directive 95/46/CE. Within the context of the Directive, the French text also 





Prior to critical examination, a thorough unpacking of that verbiage is in order. The article 
authorizes Member States to harmonize the data privacy requirements laid out in Chapters 2, 4, 
and 6 – and only those chapters – with external free expression laws. Furthermore, the authorized 
derogations may only exempt personal data processing performed solely in the pursuit of 
journalistic, artistic, or literary expression. The scope of the limits on privacy articulated in 
Article 9 is, in a word, narrow. The Directive only allows for a very select set of its provisions to 
be made compatible with a very select set of free expression laws; no such amenability is 
expected of the bulk of the Directive toward the bulk of such laws. Cate points out that only two 
of the three chapters listed are even “substantive,” with chapter six instead concerning the 
administration of the Directive.108 The inclusion of such a stringent itemization of the derogative 
standard says more about the multitude of conflicting obligations not explicitly recognized than 
the select few that are. In Cate’s words, “By the omission of any reference to the other 
substantive rights from the article permitting exceptions for expressive undertakings, it is clear 
that the [Directive]’s drafters believe that the protection of privacy is paramount to freedom of 
expression.”109 
 
                                                
108 Cate, Privacy, 43. Substantive in the legal sense refers to law “defining rights and duties 
as opposed to giving the rules by which such things are established” (New Oxford American 
Dictionary). 
109 Ibid. This sentence continues with “and the activities of the press and other authors and 
artists,” but I cut him off out of disagreement over his suddenly expansive view of privacy’s 
dominance, which I find overly broad. I believe that the Directive makes clear that, while free 
expression in general is subordinate to privacy, instances of journalistic, artistic, and literary 




The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Household	  Exemption	  
 The DPD’s travaux préparatoires – the second authoritative text – prove beyond the 
shadow of a doubt that the protection of individual privacy is the sole focus of the Household 
Exemption as well as the main focus of the entire Directive. The DPD as a whole is largely 
concerned with protecting the privacy of the data subject, whereas the Exemption is designed to 
protect the privacy of the data processor, so long as that processor is a natural person. 
Accordingly, a pedigree of strong protections for individual privacy persists through every stage 
of the Directive’s development, both for the data subject and, when concerning a natural person, 
the data processor. 
 In the first proposal for the Directive, drafted in 1990 by the European Commission, the 
Household Exemption exists in a form much different from its final iteration, one that makes 
explicit the drafters’ intention and clarifies much of the ambiguity as to which rights it should 
cover. Since it does not yet contain the word household and to differentiate it from the version 
that does, the Exemption shall be referred to as the ‘Household’ Exemption. It reads: “This 
Directive shall not apply to files held by . . . an individual solely for private and personal 
purposes.”110 Its aim is unequivocally the protection of the individual’s private sphere, as any 
“private and personal purposes” would clearly take place therein. The first draft’s preamble 
trumpets the private sphere even more explicitly: “[D]ata files falling exclusively within the 
confines of the exercise of a natural person's right to privacy, such as personal address files, 
must be excluded” from the scope of the Directive.111 The italicized portion is synonymous with 
the private sphere, and the data processor’s right to privacy is clearly given as the grounds for 
exempting their processing activities. 
                                                
110 EComm, Proposal for a Council Directive, § 3 ¶ 2(a). 
111 Ibid., ¶ 9, emphasis mine. 
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 The European Economic and Social Committee was first to offer an opinion on the 
proposal,112 applauding and reaffirming the original’s commitment to “strictly protecting the 
privacy of the individual.”113 The ‘Household’ Exemption is fully endorsed and the 
corresponding piece of the preamble not addressed, preserving the privacy-centric basis and 
championing of the private sphere.114 The only significant change is due to the Directive-wide 
rephrasing of file or data file as processing of personal data, shifting focus to the activity rather 
than the object.115 In another affirmation of privacy’s primacy, the proposal’s exception for “the 
press and the audiovisual media” – which, in the proposal, only references the freedoms of 
information and the press – is halved, the Committee excising all mention of press freedom and 
further reducing the number of competing rights afforded any inroad on individual privacy, no 
matter how small.116 
                                                
112 An opinion that, it should be noted, was afforded high regard in the formulation of the 
final, ratified Directive, it being the only text considered outside of the initial Commission 
proposal and subsequent amendments by the European Parliament and Council. 
113 EESC, Opinion on the Proposal, § 1.1. The Committee does suggest that, due to the 
references to the ECHR and Convention 108 in the Directive’s recitals, its scope “should not be 
limited to the protection of privacy,” but, because the Committee does not elaborate on that 
suggestion, it is unclear what other protections it sought (§ 2.2.1). Furthermore, the Committee 
hedges on that thought by applying the afore-discussed qualifier in particular: “It should 
however be emphasized that the aim of this protection is to guarantee, in the territory of each 
party, respect of individual rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular the right to 
privacy with regard to the automatic processing of personal data” (§ 2.1.2, emphasis mine). In a 
prescient move, the Committee also suggested that excessive effort be removed from the 
proposal’s definition of depersonalize – for some brief context, an “excessive effort in terms of 
staff, expenditure and time” would have been required to attach truly “depersonalized” personal 
data to its original host (EComm, Proposal for a Council Directive, § 2(b)) – because, in the 
Committee’s words, “a processing task requiring an excessive effort today may require no effort 
at all next year” (EESC, Opinion on the Proposal, § 2.2.2.3). 
114 EESC, Opinion on the Proposal, § 2.2.3.1. 
115 Ibid., § 2.2.1.3. 
116 Ibid., § 2.2.16.2. 
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 The European Parliament made the first substantive amendments to the proposal, many 
of which complement or extend the original’s focus on individual privacy.117 Notably, 
Parliament cripples the priority given to ensuring the free flow of data; strengthens the 
requirements for anonymizing data; drastically expands the scope of processing activities 
regulated; and, in contrast to the considerable changes to nearly every other part of the proposal, 
leaves the ‘Household’ Exemption virtually untouched. The original proposal requires that 
Member States “neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal data [within the European 
Community] for reasons to do with the protection” of privacy,118 a strong limitation thereon, but 
Parliament rejects that notion, not only calling for the reconciliation of the two competing 
interests but demanding “a high level of protection” for personal data.119 In its next amendment, 
Parliament raises the threshold of anonymity that would have to be met for data to be considered 
depersonalized, increasing security for individual privacy at the expense of data processors.120 In 
addition, three new genres of activity are added to the range of processing operations regulated 
by the Directive, continuing the expansion of privacy’s dominance.121 Despite its invention of a 
multitude of new exemptions coequal to the ‘Household’ Exemption, Parliament faithfully 
preserves both the latter and its explanatory companion in the Preamble. In the Exemption, files 
is erased in favor of personal data and purposes recast as activities,122 and, in the Preamble, data 
                                                
117 It should be noted that Parliament did not consider the Economic and Social Committee’s 
suggestions. 
118 EComm, Proposal for a Council Directive, § 1 ¶ 2. 
119 EP, Minutes of Proceedings, Part II § 19 – Amendment 11. 
120 Ibid., Amendment 12. For a brief explanation of depersonalization, see note 113 above. 
121 Ibid., Amendment 15. 
122 Ibid., Amendment 22; 130. 
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files is broadened into data, with neither of the changes impacting the ‘Household’ Exemption’s 
overwhelming focus on the private sphere.123 
 Taking account of Parliament’s amendments and the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee, the European Commission revised its original proposal. The Commission notes that 
the primary purpose of the new version remains ensuring “a high level of protection” for 
individual privacy.124 They reemphasize that specially-protected status in quadrupling the 
number of times privacy is placed above the other fundamental rights and freedoms by way of 
the previously-analyzed qualifier notamment.125 In this draft, the ‘Household’ Exemption’s focus 
on the private sphere and individual privacy remains unambiguous, the wording slightly 
modified but the meaning wholly intact. The Preamble obscures the original proposal’s clear 
promotion of the inviolability of the private sphere; however, the essence is unchanged, with 
“processing carried out by a natural person for purely private purposes” still excluded from the 
Directive’s scope.126 Any purely private activity would unquestionably fall within the private 
sphere. Arguably, the limits of that sphere extend only to purely private activities, with anything 
less straddling the gray boundary between private and public. Therefore, the Commission’s 
second rendering of the Preamble’s explanatory section maintains the private sphere as the ambit 
of the ‘Household’ Exemption. The Exemption itself is slightly tweaked to exclude from the 
Directive “the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely private 
                                                
123 Ibid., Amendment 1. 
124 EComm, Communication to the European Parliament, § 2. 
125 EComm, Amended Proposal, ¶ 2; 10; 32. The prioritization of privacy in the ninth recital 
of the amended proposal (¶ 9) is the only holdover from the original proposal (¶ 7). 
126 Ibid., ¶ 11. 
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and personal activity,” effectively identical to its individual privacy-focused formulation in the 
original proposal.127 
 Twenty-eight months pass between the Commission’s adoption of its amended proposal 
in October 1992 and the next iteration of the Directive, the European Council’s common position 
of February 1995. In the Council’s version, the Exemption needs no scare quotes around 
‘Household,’ having blossomed into its ultimate form, complete with the reference to “purely 
personal or household” activities.128 In fact, both the exemption and corresponding whereas 
recital are now worded exactly how they appear in the final Directive, to be ratified eight months 
later. It is unclear how the Council arrived at its decision to modify “purely private and personal 
activity” into “purely personal or household activity.” In the intervening twenty-eight months, 
the Commission transmitted its amended proposal to the Council and Parliament; the draft was 
updated to accommodate changes brought about by the Maastricht Treaty, which established the 
current European Union; and, then . . . nothing. The official timeline documenting the 
Directive’s progress from initial proposal to final ratification is, with the exception of the 
Maastricht-inspired revision, completely blank between October 1992 and February 1995.129 A 
deep dive into the record of the Council’s minutes during that time would no doubt provide 
fascinating insight into the deliberations over the Exemption’s wording. However, within the 
scope of this paper, the salient point is not the exact path taken to arrive at “purely personal or 
household” but the fact that the Council arrived there without altering the Exemption’s 
foundation and, derivatively, its meaning. 
                                                
127 Ibid., § 3 ¶ 2. 
128 EC, Common Position (EC) 1/95, § 3 ¶ 2. 
129 EU, “100979 – Procedure.” The post-Maastricht update did not affect the draft Directive’s 
content; its sole purpose was to modify the draft’s legal basis to reflect the foundational treaties 
of the newly minted EU. 
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 The Council expressly acknowledges that it made certain amendments “to clarify or 
simplify the text,” and it is telling that the interpretive foundation of the Exemption – namely, the 
instruments cited as the draft Directive’s basis and the references to earlier versions within the 
drafting process – remain unchanged while the Exemption itself is clarified. In the run-up to its 
whereas recitals, the Council’s common position gives regard to its four main foundational 
documents: the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEEC),130 the original and 
amended Commission proposals, and the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee.131 The 
TEEC is less important at present, as it lays out the general procedure by which a directive is 
issued. By contrast, the other three texts cited in the common position – along with the opinion 
and decision of Parliament and the common position itself – form part of that procedure for this 
specific Directive. 
 The drafting procedure for the Directive began with an original proposal by the 
Commission, and each subsequent text builds upon its antecedents, correcting what is incorrect, 
clarifying what is unclear, and preserving what is perfect. By tracking the amount, type, and 
significance of changes made to a particular section or idea within the Directive, it is possible to 
gauge the level of confidence that the drafters have in that section or idea. A section that has 
undergone many substantial rewrites indicates a certain ambiguity or openness to debate; an idea 
that has remained constant throughout the drafting process highlights not only its fundamentality, 
its lineage extending uninterrupted to the Directive’s origins, but also its indisputability. 
 The Directive’s central concepts and sources are laid out in the original proposal and 
undergo very little transformation throughout the drafting process. The protection of the right to 
                                                
130 This is the circa-1995 name of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), which was amended and renamed in 2007 by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
131 EC, Common Position (EC) 1/95. 
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privacy, with reference to the ECHR, the general principles of European law, and, especially, 
Convention 108, is asserted in the original proposal as the Directive’s main objective;132 recalled 
in the Economic and Social Committee’s opinion;133 affirmed without amendment on 
Parliament’s first reading; and strengthened in the Commission’s amended proposal, with 
privacy garnering additional attention.134 By the time the Council gets a say, the protection of 
individual privacy has been unequivocally affirmed four times as the Directive’s purpose. The 
Household Exemption, which draws its rationale from that purpose and is designed to protect the 
privacy of the individual data processor, follows a similar path: it undergoes several aesthetic 
transformations that serve to clarify its meaning, but that meaning itself never wavers. By the 
time it reaches the Council, the ‘Household’ Exemption (as it was prior to the Council’s addition 
of the household qualifier) has been indisputably confirmed four times as a protection for the 
individual’s private sphere and right to privacy. Though the Council does rather radically alter 
the wording of the Exemption, it is clear that the new language is simply a refinement of the 
principles consistently upheld throughout the drafting process; the words may be different, but 
the justification for and purpose of the Household Exemption is constant. 
	  
The	  CJEU’s	  Affirmation	  of	  the	  Exemption’s	  Focus	  on	  Privacy	  
 In a 2003 case known as Lindqvist, the Court of Justice of the European Union offered an 
identical interpretation of the Household Exemption, affirming its purpose as a strong protection 
                                                
132 EComm, Proposal for a Council Directive, ¶ 7; 22. 
133 EESC, Opinion on the Proposal, § 1.1.1; 1.5; 2.1.3; 2.2.1. 
134 EComm, Amended Proposal, ¶ 9-10. 
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for individual privacy and, especially, the private sphere of the individual who processes 
personal data.135 
 In autumn 1998, Bodil Lindqvist was working as a volunteer catechist in the parish of 
Alseda in the south of Sweden.136 At the same time, she was enrolled in a computer skills course, 
and one of her assignments was to create a website.137 In order to help parishioners prepare for 
confirmation, Lindqvist decided to create web pages containing general information about 
herself, her husband, and seventeen of her colleagues, including, among other things: given or 
full names, jobs and hobbies, family circumstances, telephone numbers, and other personal 
information.138 She made the pages on her personal computer at home, and, at Lindqvist’s 
request, her site was hyperlinked from the church’s website.139 She did not obtain prior approval 
from any of the other individuals before posting the information to the Internet.140 When some of 
them expressed dissatisfaction with their personal data being available online, Lindqvist quickly 
removed the offending web page.141 However, Swedish authorities still chose to prosecute her 
under Sweden’s domestic implementation of the DPD, the Personal Data Act 
(Personuppgiftslagen) of 1998. The Swedish Data Protection Authority (Datainspektionen) won 
its initial case against Lindqvist in district court (Eksjö tingsrätt), resulting in a fine of 4,000 
Swedish kronor and a requirement that she donate a further 300 to a general Swedish fund for 
victims.142 Lindqvist appealed the judgment to the Göta Court of Appeal (Göta hovrätt) in 
                                                
135 CJEU, Judgment of the Court. 
136 CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, 6. 
137 Karlsson, “Öppen Kanal i Radio.” 
138 CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, 6. 
139 CJEU, Judgment of the Court, ¶ 12. 
140 Ibid., ¶ 14. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid., ¶ 17. The full fine of 4,300 SEK in 2000 is equal to roughly $700 USD in 2014. 
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Jönköping, which promptly referred seven questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of the Directive.143 
 Among those seven questions, the Göta Court asks whether Lindqvist’s actions fall 
within the Directive’s scope – specifically, whether they are covered by Article 3§2 (which 
contains the Household Exemption) – and whether the Directive’s privacy protections interfere 
with free expression or other fundamental rights and freedoms.144 The CJEU quickly affirms that 
making others’ personal data accessible via the World Wide Web constitutes processing and 
should be regulated by the Directive.145 The question then becomes whether Lindqvist’s actions 
should be excluded from scrutiny under one of the special exemptions listed in Article 3§2: 
either the exemption for activities falling “outside the scope of Community law” (first indent) or 






2.  This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data: 
 
–– in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, 
such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union 
and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence, 
State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the 
processing operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the 
State in areas of criminal law, 
 
–– by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. 
 
                                                
143 Ibid., ¶ 1. 
144 Ibid., ¶ 18. 
145 Ibid., ¶ 27. 
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 The CJEU finds that Lindqvist’s actions do not fall under the first indent’s exemption, 
citing the principle of ejusdem generis.146 Since the given examples of activities falling outside 
the scope of Community law are all State undertakings, it is implied that the first indent was 
intended only to apply to and exempt State action. With the first indent sorted, the Court turns its 
attention to the Household Exemption. 
 The CJEU refers to the explanatory section of the Preamble straight away, noting its 
classification of “correspondence and the holding of records of addresses” as “activities which 
are exclusively personal or domestic.”147 Bearing those examples in mind, the Court states that 
the Household Exemption “must therefore be interpreted as relating only to activities which are 
carried out in the course of private or family life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with 
the processing of personal data consisting in publication on the [World Wide Web].”148 The 
Court finds that Lindqvist’s actions do not fall under the Household Exemption, but, more 
pertinently, it reaches that conclusion by citing the natural person’s private sphere – which 
encompasses both private and family life – as the exclusive site of purely personal or household 
activities and, as a result, the exclusive determinant of exemption.149 Furthermore, between the 
two exempted activities listed in the Preamble and the CJEU’s exemption of pursuits in private 
or family life, the scope of protections under the Exemption almost perfectly parallels the scope 
                                                
146 Ibid., ¶ 43-5. Ejusdem generis is described in the Oxford Dictionary of Law (7 ed.) as 
follows: “[W]hen a list of specific items belonging to the same class is followed by general 
words (as in ‘cats, dogs, and other animals’), the general words are to be treated as confined to 
other items of the same class (in this example, to other domestic animals).” 
147 EC and EP, Directive 95/46/EC, ¶ 12. 
148 CJEU, Judgment of the Court, ¶ 47. 




of the right to privacy protected in the Charter and ECHR.150 The mirroring is no doubt 
intentional, and it once again underscores the strong influence of the fundamental rights treaties 














                                                
150 The Charter and ECHR protect private and family life, the home, and 
communications/correspondence. The Household Exemption protects private and family life, 
household activities (such as keeping an address book), and correspondence. 
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Problems	  for	  the	  Present:	  Misinterpretations,	  Misreadings,	  and	  
Misunderstandings	  of	  the	  Exemption	  and	  the	  Private	  Sphere	  
Public	  and	  Private	  Spheres	  and	  Expression	  
 
 With the protection of the private sphere firmly established as the Household 
Exemption’s basis, it is time to address the increasingly widespread, problematic, and erroneous 
attempts to expand the scope of the Exemption beyond the private sphere and into the public, 
eroding the Exemption’s strong foundation of privacy and sabotaging the natural person’s right 
thereto. These forays stem from good intentions – namely, the desire to protect the individual’s 
privacy – but their true effect is damaging, with disproportionate harm to the privacy of others 
and the protection of a sphere that, while appearing on the surface to be private, is decidedly 
public. 
 Claims that the Household Exemption’s scope has expanded since its initial construction 
have merit, but it is important to restrict that expansion so as to preserve the Exemption’s 
purpose. Technological development has exponentially increased the types of processing 
possible for individuals, activities both purely within the private sphere and those stretching into 
the public. The interpretive fallacy occurs when one notices that just about every type of 
processing available to the individual in 1995 – recall WP29’s illustrative list – would have been 
covered under the Exemption and so assumes that just about every type of processing available 
to the individual in 2014 should be covered. Many new processing capabilities do occur 
exclusively within the private sphere, such as private messages exchanged via social media or a 
photo album shared online amongst a family, and they are relatives (or simply evolutions) of the 
same types of processing initially protected by the Exemption. However, there are also a whole 
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slew of new processing powers available to natural persons that quite clearly extend past the 
private and into the public sphere, such as the individual’s novel ability to disseminate 
information indiscriminately and on a massive scale. As WP29 notes, many of these processing 
activities new to the individual have long been available to “certain organisations, for example 
media or publishing companies,” the actions of which might have fallen under the Article 9 
exemption for journalistic, artistic, or literary expression. 
 In fact, more and more often, the Household Exemption is conflated with the Article 9 
exemption for certain types of journalistic, artistic, or literary expression, to disastrous results for 
individual privacy. Recalling the earlier examination of Article 9, it permits Member States to 
exempt those three types of public expression in very specific, limited circumstances: the 
derogations may only concern provisions in three specific chapters of the Directive; the 
processing exempted must be solely for journalistic, artistic, or literary purposes; and, even if 
both of those criteria are satisfied, the derogations are legitimate “only if they are necessary to 
reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression.”151 Article 9 is a 
narrow protection freeing certain processing activities of artists, authors, and journalists from 
Directive scrutiny, but, through widespread conflation, it has taken on a much more significant 
role in the misunderstanding of the Household Exemption. 
 In a report on the ongoing data protection reform, the Article 29 Working Party 
comments on the growing confusion: 
[Historically, the Household Exemption] has been quite distinct with regard to its 
scope from the exemption relating to the purposes of journalism or artistic or 
literary expression. However, increasingly, this is not the case. Rather than 
relating to individuals’ correspondence or their holding of records of addresses, 
for example, the queries and complaints DPAs receive increasingly concern 
individuals’ publication of personal data, either about themselves or about other 
                                                
151 EC and EP, Directive 95/46/EC, § 9. 
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individuals. It would be wrong to say that all of an individual’s personal online 
activity is being done for the purposes of journalism or artistic or literary 
expression. However, the advent of ‘citizen’ bloggers and the use of social 
networking sites to carry out different forms of public expression, mean that the 
two exemptions have become conflated.152 
 
To summarize, singling out the unsound reasoning: the exemptions were distinct, with the 
Household Exemption protecting the private sphere of the data processor and Article 9 protecting 
certain types of public expression; advances in technology then made it possible for natural 
persons to publicly express themselves in a manner approximating the activities exempted in 
Article 9; since that publication can occur in the course of their personal online activity, it must 
fall somewhere in between Article 9 and the Household Exemption. 
 Certain types of individual free expression – such as those emanating from citizen 
journalists,153 artists, and authors, who have an unprecedented ability to disseminate their work 
to the masses – should absolutely fall under the exemption for journalistic, artistic, or literary 
expression. There is no reason to discriminate against natural persons in the application of 
Article 9, and both the Directive and the article itself make no such distinction. However, to 
assert that any type of free expression might fall under the Household Exemption is simply 
nonsensical and a gross misrepresentation of the exemption’s purpose. 
 
Social	  Media	  and	  Balancing	  Rights	  
 Social networking sites, singled out by WP29 as the principal development since the 
DPD’s enactment, are far and away the most dynamic conduits of individual free expression. In 
                                                
152 WP29, Statement, 1-2. 
153 Citizen journalism is defined as “independent reporting, often by amateurs on the scene of 
an event, which is disseminated globally through modern media, most often the Internet (for 
example, through photo- or video-sharing sites, blogs, microblogs, online forums, message 
boards, social networks, podcasts, and so forth)” (La Rue, Citizen Journalism, 17-18). 
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its commentary on the ongoing data protection reform, the Working Party stresses the 
importance of hammering out the “legal uncertainty” surrounding the interaction of social 
networks with the Household Exemption.154 The perception of legal haziness stems from a desire 
to interpret the Exemption as balancing other fundamental rights of the individual – namely the 
right to free expression – against the Directive’s strong protections for their right to privacy. 
After acknowledging “the use of social networking sites to carry out different forms of public 
expression” and the increasing number of complaints arising from “individuals’ publication of 
personal data,” WP29 draws the conclusion that the proposed Regulation must ameliorate the 
Directive’s “anachronistic” Household Exemption,155 which, in their mind, does not 
appropriately balance free expression and privacy: 
Given the scale of individuals’ use of the [World Wide Web] for their personal 
purposes – something that is sure to increase as the next generations of ‘digital 
natives’ conduct more and more of their personal activity online – it is essential 
that the proposed Regulation adopts an approach to personal or household 
processing that . . . . [s]trikes the right balance between the protection of privacy 
and the right to receive and impart information.156 
 
The perceived need to balance competing rights speaks to a fundamental misinterpretation of the 
Exemption’s foundations and thrust as a strong protection for individual privacy – and only 
individual privacy. WP29 is hardly alone in basing its recommendations for the Household 
Exemption off of a misreading – in fact, the official Handbook on European data protection law 
asserts that the exemption of personal or household processing is because “[s]uch processing is 
generally seen as part of the freedoms of the private individual.”157 
                                                
154 WP29, Statement, 3. 
155 Ibid., 1-2. 
156 Ibid., 7. 
157 EUAFR and CoE, Handbook, 19. 
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 The Working Party’s consideration of alternative, expansive interpretations of the 
Household Exemption is curious in light of its recognition of the Exemption’s exclusive focus on 
the private sphere, even in the context of social networks. In its Opinion 5/2009 on online social 
networking, WP29 acknowledges that certain uses of social media are purely personal or 
household in nature while others enter the public sphere, with the composition and size of the 
audience the deciding factor. In describing the former, the Working Party notes that many users 
of social media “operate within a purely personal sphere, contacting people as part of the 
management of their personal, family or household affairs. In such cases . . . the ‘household 
exemption’ applies.”158 By contrast, “[w]hen access to profile information extends beyond self-
selected contacts, such as when access to a profile is provided to all members within the SNS or 
the data is indexable by search engines, access goes beyond the personal or household sphere.”159 
This is consistent with the CJEU’s decision in Lindqvist, which also held the size of the audience 
to be the determining factor in demarcating the public from the private sphere. The Court 
highlighted that making personal data “accessible to an indefinite number of people” is clearly 
not an activity “carried out in the course of private or family life” – in other words, in the private 
sphere.160 
 
A	  Familiar	  Exemption	  in	  the	  Draft	  GDPR	  
 Lacking any allusion to the CJEU’s guidance on audience size, the Household Exemption 
in the initial proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation includes several major additions 
                                                
158 WP29, Opinion 5/2009, 3. 
159 Ibid., 6. 
160 CJEU, Judgment of the Court, ¶ 47. 
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but largely resembles its precursor in the Directive. The correspondent whereas recital and 




(15) This Regulation should not apply to processing of personal data by a 
natural person, which are exclusively personal or domestic, such as 
correspondence and the holding of addresses, and without any gainful 
interest and thus without any connection with a professional or 
commercial activity. The exemption should also not apply to controllers or 
processors which provide the means for processing personal data for such 






2. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: 
 
 (d) by a natural person without any gainful interest in the course of its own 
exclusively personal or household activity; 
 
 The substitution of exclusively for purely in the Exemption’s text is unimportant – while 
it does imply a higher standard of exclusivity, the Directive’s whereas recital already employs 
the term in its enumeration of “exclusively personal or domestic” activities. The salient change is 
the requirement that exempted processing activities be “without any gainful interest and thus 
without any connection with a professional or commercial activity.”161 The emphasis on 
occupational processing activities is problematic because, in tandem with the misinterpretation of 
household as implying the physical domain of the home, it engenders and emboldens the 
                                                
161 EComm, Proposal for a Regulation, ¶ 15. 
  
52 
misconception that the Exemption covers all individual processing that is non-professional or 
occurs in the course of home life.162 
 Individuals processing personal data for commercial or professional reasons are 
indisputably beyond the Exemption’s scope, but it is easy to read into that prominent rejection of 
professional activities an unconditional endorsement of non-professional processing – for 
example, recreational use of social networking sites. Broadcasting messages to a large audience 
via social media is not an activity restricted to the private sphere, but, by misconstruing the 
Household Exemption to protect activities that are non-professional, recreational, or performed 
within the physical space of the home, it is sometimes read as such. Through the lens of the 
misconstruction, expression via social media is exempt for one of two reasons: either because it 
is undertaken from within a protected residential space or because it is not done for professional 
purposes. 
 Part of the problem is due to the misinterpretation of household as referring to the 
physical location of the processing activity. The misconception is understandable; after all, the 
adjective is often used to describe something intended for domestic use as contrasted with 
business or commercial purposes – something achievable or existing in the home, e.g., household 
appliances, chores, pets, products, or staff. The home as a secure, physical space integral to a 
natural person’s right to privacy has a long lineage of special protection, from the U.S. Supreme 
Court (SCOTUS) to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In Payton v. New York, the 
                                                
162 In the latest draft of the GDPR – the Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution 
submitted by Rapporteur Jan Philipp Albrecht of Germany, which Parliament adopted by a vote 
of 621 in favor and 10 against, with 22 abstentions – the qualification of without any gainful 
interest has been removed from the Exemption and Preamble, but the latter’s reference to 




SCOTUS drew “a firm line at the entrance to the house,”163 asserting “physical entry of the home 
[to be] the chief evil against which” privacy must be protected.164 Typifying the definitional 
gravitation toward the physical space when household or the home are used in reference to the 
right to privacy, the Court, in discussing protections for “the individual's privacy in a variety of 
settings,” held that “[in none of the settings] is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than 
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home.”165 The 
ECtHR, the privacy jurisprudence of which has been strongly influenced by the SCOTUS,166 
echoes the prevalence of construing home as physical space: “Article 8 of the Convention 
protects the individual’s right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. A home will usually be the place, the physically defined area, where private and 
family life develops.”167 The ECtHR develops the private-public boundary far beyond the simple 
physical limits of the home, but, for present purposes, all that matters is the Court’s confirmation 
that home – or household, which the Court uses interchangeably with the (physical) family 
home168 – is often understood to refer only to “the physically defined area.” 
 Contrastingly, as evidenced by the earlier outline of its lineage, the Exemption does not 
use household in the sense of location, instead intending it to stand in for family life. The latter 
comprises part of the inviolable sphere of personal privacy protected in major international 
                                                
163 SCOTUS, Payton v. New York, 590. 
164 Ibid., 585-586, quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 407 
U.S. 313. 
165 Ibid., 589. 
166 E.g., the ECtHR references SCOTUS’s “expectation of privacy” test – from Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) – in, inter alia, Halford v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
523, at ¶ 45 (1998); P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, at ¶ 57; Peck 
v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, at ¶ 111 (2003); Peev v. Bulgaria, 2007-IX Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 655, at ¶ 38-39; Perry v. United Kingdom, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, at ¶ 37 (2004); and Von 
Hannover v. Germany, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at ¶ 51, 69, 78 (2004). 
167 ECtHR, Moreno Gómez v. Spain, at ¶ 53, emphasis mine. 
168 E.g., X and Others v. Austria, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 (2013). 
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human rights treaties, but household, instead of being correctly read as a synonym of family life, 
is often misconstrued as an antonym of professional (in the occupational sense). Though WP29 
correctly divides social networking activities into public or private processing in its Opinion 
5/2009 on online social networking – and, to be fair, it hints back at that correct understanding 
throughout its report on the Household Exemption – in the latter document the Working Party 
plays into the definitional confusion, consistently contrasting purely personal or household 
activities with professional activities to set up the former as a synonym of non-professional. For 
example, in relating the types of processing that typically receive scrutiny from national Data 
Protection Authorities, WP29 pits “private [citizens processing] personal data for their own 
personal or household activities” against “processing done by corporate entities or by natural 
persons . . . acting in a professional capacity.”169 The professional/non-professional binary is 
solidified in WP29’s recommended amendments to the proposed GDPR’s Household 
Exemption. The Working Party adds to the Preamble’s list of “exclusively personal or domestic” 
processing activities the requirement that the processing be “outside the pursuit of a commercial 
or professional objective,”170 and they repeatedly stress that processing “done as part of a 
professional activity” falls outside of the Exemption’s scope.171 The Working Party even goes so 
far as to include the following question in its “set of basic criteria” that national Data Protection 
Authorities should use in determining whether the processing activities of an individual are of a 
“personal or household” nature: “Does the scale and frequency of the processing of personal 
data suggest professional or full-time activity?”172 The consequences of that mistake made the 
                                                
169 WP29, Statement, 1. 
170 Ibid., 10. 
171 Ibid., 7. 
172 Ibid., 4. 
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leap from theoretical to real when DPAs crystallized the misguided interpretation into their 
enforcement practices, focusing “almost exclusively” on processing of a professional nature.173 
 The misrepresentation of purely personal or household as non-professional or within the 
physical home is problematic for a number of reasons; most notably, such an understanding 
would drastically expand the scope of activities protected under the Household Exemption, with 
disastrous repercussions for individual privacy. Activities of the private sphere, the Exemption’s 
correct scope, are very limited in influence and reach. They are bounded within the confines of 
the private sphere’s constitutive domains: its sub-spheres of the individual, the family, and the 
circle of intimate friends. By contrast, any processing not done for an explicit occupational aim – 
any leisure or recreational activity – or taking place within the physical limits of the home could 
be read into the overly broad, incorrect understanding of the Exemption’s scope. 
 Though still incorrect, that logic might have flown in 1995. Natural persons generally did 
not possess the means to process personal data in the public sphere – thinking specifically of 
mass dissemination or otherwise making data available – either from the confines of the home or 
outside of their professional capacity. An individual may have been able to accomplish such 
processing through occupational connections (e.g., if they worked for a newspaper or broadcast 
corporation) or if they had the financial means to engage those media enterprises to carry out the 
processing, but the average citizen’s processing options outside of the private sphere were 
severely limited, if existent at all. Historically, the press has been the “prime enemy” of data 
privacy, but that starring role was largely a product of its access to the means for mass 
dissemination.174 Now that publishing power has percolated down to the people, “this concern 
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does not end with media exposure. Any other agent that gathers and disseminates information 
can also pose such dangers.”175 
 
Social	  Networks	  Blur	  the	  Boundary	  Between	  Public	  and	  Private	  
 The new ways in which publishing power allows individuals to transcend the private-
public boundary are only half of the data privacy problem fueled by the rise of social media. The 
other half is the increasing haziness of that boundary separating public from private. danah 
boyd’s doctoral thesis, “Taken Out of Context: American Teen Sociality in Networked Publics,” 
illuminates the ways in which social networks blur the boundary between private and public. 
 The most noticeable evolution is in the unprecedented access to the public sphere 
afforded to individuals physically situated within traditionally private spaces, such as the home. 
boyd interviews a girl named Amy who “relishes the opportunity to have a social life while 
restricted to her house.”176 Amy’s desire demonstrates the separation of and widening rift 
between the physical and social private-public boundaries. In 1995, the boundaries ran parallel, 
and entry into the social public entailed a corresponding ingress into the physical; for example, 
leaving one’s home to attend a public gathering or posting fliers in public spaces. Today, no such 
congruence exists, as one can enter the public discourse or act in the public sphere irrespective of 
physical location. Jürgen Habermas – who, earlier in this paper, provided the polis/oikos history 
of privacy – notes that public is generally understood as something “open to all, in contrast to 
closed or exclusive affairs.”177 Hannah Arendt echoes Habermas, arguing “that one approach to 
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thinking about public is that which ‘can be seen and heard by everybody.’”178 Both definitions 
downplay the public’s traditional physical limits, stressing instead publication and the socially 
constructed bounds of the public in the era of social media. Drawing from the discipline of new 
media studies, boyd cites Sonia Livingstone’s equation of public with audience – another 
emphasis on sociality instead of physicality and an especially useful comparison in light of the 
CJEU’s focus on the audience in Lindqvist.179 
 Less noticeable but with equally relevant ramifications on the private-public boundary, 
social networks have diluted the definition of friendship, clouding that once-clear sub-sphere of 
private life. “[T]he distinction between the private and public sphere has muddled, with users of 
social media broadcasting personal information to sometime strangers whom they label 
‘friends,’” explains Omer Tene in a recent article.180 He continues: 
[Y]oung people do not conceive social media as a ‘public’ space, reflecting a shift 
in our understanding of the delineation of what is public and private. . . . [W]hile 
not ‘public’, Facebook is clearly not a ‘private’ space, at least not in the 
traditional sense. While apparently a closed network of friends, the concept of 
‘friend’ on a social network is quite distinct from that in the offline world. danah 
boyd explains that ‘because of how these sites function, there is no distinction 
between siblings, lovers, schoolmates, and strangers. They are all lumped under 
one category: Friends.’ Moreover, certain information posted on social 
networking sites is publicly available to users and non-users alike, and is even 
searchable by search engines such as Google.181 
 
As a subset of the grand sphere of the private, the Household Exemption is intended to protect 
the interactions of friends. However, social networks have drastically lowered the traditional 
standard of intimacy required for a relationship to make the jump from mere 
                                                
178 boyd, “Taken Out of Context,” 17, quoting Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 50, emphasis mine. 
179 Ibid., 20, citing Sonia Livingstone, Audiences and Publics: When Cultural Engagement 
Matters for the Public Sphere, Portland, OR: Intellect, 2005. 
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acquaintanceship, which is not a protected sub-sphere of individual privacy, to friendship, which 
is. To borrow boyd’s language: with contacts on social media “lumped” into the category of 
friends,182 it is often difficult to discern whether an individual is sharing personal data solely with 
intimate friends or with others from the public, at large. The former is a protected activity under 
the Household Exemption, but the latter, transcending the private and entering the public, is 
decidedly not. 
Toward	  the	  Future:	  Shoring	  up	  the	  Trenches	  for	  Privacy	  
 The increasing ambiguousness in defining social networks as exclusively public or 
private spaces is emblematic of the uncertainty surrounding the Household Exemption during 
this crucial redrafting. The current version is only intended to exclude from Directive scrutiny 
processing within the sphere of private life. Many advanced processing capabilities of natural 
persons – most notably their newfound powers of publishing and mass dissemination – are 
unquestionably outside of the Exemption’s scope, yet too often they are incorrectly read into it. 
 To recall a claim made earlier in this paper: the time is now ripe for a thorough 
reconstruction of the Exemption. Regardless of whether individual privacy is shored up or 
destroyed, the current ambiguities must be ironed out. And that is the beauty of addressing the 
issue at this moment, in the midst of the larger redrafting process: E.U. legislators have the 
                                                
182 As social connections are termed by Facebook, Google+, and VK (formerly VKontakte). 
The key distinction between friends on Facebook or VK and, for example, followers on 
Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter is that the former type of connection requires the assent of both 
parties (both “friends”) while the latter, by default, does not. However, Facebook, Instagram, and 
Twitter all provide users the option of requiring user approval for all new requests to follow, and 
much of the sharing on those sites occurs between individuals who each follow the other, 
approximating the relationship of online friends. Other popular sites also use terms that are 
identical in meaning to friends, such as connections (LinkedIn). Similarly, Google+ instructs 
users to arrange their contacts into circles, of which friends is a default grouping. 
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option of pushing the privacy needle in either direction. Should they wish to shore up the 
trenches, gird for battle, and go to war for privacy, they have only to respond to erroneous 
interpretations with a resounding affirmation of the Exemption’s original intent. However, 
should they instead wish to cede the struggle and place liberty of action above personal privacy, 
it would require but a sentence to decisively exempt all personal processing activities. 
 While the latter option may appeal to an overzealous libertarian, it is an unlikely outcome 
for several reasons. Such a base subordination of privacy to other rights would be a strange 
direction for an instrument ostensibly designed to accomplish the opposite. Furthermore, most 
sources addressing the Household Exemption’s scope mention the CJEU’s guidance in Lindqvist. 
There is a fairly strong consensus that processing activities with an unlimited audience do not 
fall under the Exemption, so, at the very least, a limitation on exceptionally impersonal 
processing exists. Finally, the importance of the redrafting’s foundations cannot be overstated. 
The GDPR is designed as a modernization of the Directive, an adaption of its outdated core to a 
contemporary context – not a reversal or repudiation of its substance. 
 At the other end of the spectrum, an unqualified affirmation of the Household 
Exemption’s original purpose is probably also out of the question. Among other repercussions, 
the chilling effect such an act would have on free expression will likely ward off would-be 
champions of privacy. 
 The Exemption is therefore caught in a liminal space between the two theoretical 
extremes of the privacy needle. Its reliance on unspecific language – a manifestation of the 




 In this author’s opinion, a departure from the foundations of strong privacy – from the 
UDHR, ECHR, and ICCPR through to the Charter, Convention 108, and Directive – would be 
imprudent.183 Without sacrificing the goal of broad protection, the Exemption’s language should 
be recast so as to clearly delineate activities of the sphere of private life as its sole focus. Strong 
privacy protections do not come without strings attached; tradeoffs are necessary. The right to 
data privacy had rarely been afforded status equal to that of other fundamental rights, let alone 
greater. As Cate notes, because Europe’s emphasis on privacy “raises the value placed on 
protecting [the right], it justifies sweeping regulation . . . and considerable costs imposed on 
individuals. . . . [Those costs operate] as a tax on European citizens . . . justified by the high 
value placed upon privacy.”184 
 Social networks are incredible, their prolific rise revolutionizing the ways in which we 
connect, interact, and live. They are already pervasive and only growing more so – the online 
social world is here to stay, and there is no stopping its continued growth. However, it is our duty 
to ensure that the growth is reasonable, responsible, and respectful of fundamental human rights 





                                                
183 This, taken with the rest of the strong focus on history and precedent within this paper, may 
be a manifestation of a subconscious, American proclivity toward common law – that is, toward 
the familiar. 





Article 2.2(d) of the most recent draft Data Protection Regulation reads: 
 
This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data . . . by a natural person in the 
course of an exclusively personal or household activity. This exemption also shall apply to a 
publication of personal data where it can be reasonably expected that it will be only accessed by 
a limited number of persons. 
 
 
It should be reworded to read: 
 
This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data . . . by a natural person in the 
course of an activity falling exclusively within the sphere of private life protected by the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and other binding international treaties.	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